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Abstract
We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (1981) for behavior selection
in symmetric conflict games in large populations. This rule uses organisms’ past,
accumulated rewards as the predictor for future behavior, and can be traced in
many life forms from bacteria to humans. We derive a partial differential equa-
tion (PDE) that describes the stochastic learning in a heterogeneous population of
agents. The equation has a structure of the conservation of mass type equation in
the space of stimuli to engage in a particular behavior. We analyze the solutions
of the PDE model for symmetric 2x2 games. It is found that in games with small
residual stimuli, adaptive learning rules with larger memory factor converge faster
to the optimal outcome.
Keywords: Adaptive learning, relative payoff sum, symmetric games
1. Introduction
The seminal paper Maynard Smith & Price (1973) introduced the concepts
of game theory into the study of animal behavior to explain the evolution of be-
havioral traits. To this end, a notion of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) was
developed to describe stable outcomes of natural selection, by defining it as being
uninvadable by pure or mixed strategies players. A dynamical process leading to
an ESS can be formalized by the following model. Consider a situation where
each individual in a population consistently uses one of the available behavioral
traits t1, .., tk to interact with other members and no mutations take place. As-
sume the choice of the behavior (action) is inherited, and the population consists
of groups that use a particular behavior. Over a long period of time involving
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large number of interactions, the average fitness per game for individuals using
ti, denoted by Wi, is compared to the population average fitness W¯ , and the indi-
viduals in ti-group are reproduced at rate proportional to Wi/W¯. If the changes in
the frequencies of ti are approximately continuous Taylor & Joniker (1978), Zee-
man (1981) derived the replicator dynamics equations for the frequencies mi of
individuals acting according to ti :
dmi
dt
= kmi(Wi−W¯ ), i = 1..N (1)
and showed that ESS’s are the asymptotically stable fixed points of this system of
equations.
Considered from the point of view of game theory, an evolutionarily stable
strategy is a refinement of a Nash equilibrium, which describes an optimal choice
of actions in games. This way, natural selection is a mechanism for implementing
a rational decision-making in the evolution of species. There is another way by
which organisms, even without complex cognition, can discover optimal actions.
It can be achieved through their ability to regulate behaviors depending on the ex-
perience, in particular, through the tendency to repeat positive and avoid negative
experiences. This is known as the law of effect, first formulated by Thorndike
(1989), and generally accepted as one of the main paradigms of animal behavior,
see for example, Ferster & Skinner (1957), Herrnstein (1961), Herrnstein (1970),
Catania (1963), Chung & Herrnstein (1967), Domjan & Burkhard (1986).
The law of effect is the basis for the reinforcement learning models. They
were introduced by Bush & Mosteller (1955), and since then have been applied
to problems in such diverse areas as biology, economics, and engineering. Some
representative examples of the extensive literature on this subject can be found in
Harley (1981), Cross (1983), Roth & Erev (1995), Erev & Roth (1998), Sutton &
Barto (1998), Sandholdm (2010), Nax & Perc (2015).
Interestingly enough, Brgers & Sarin (1997) demonstrated that models of
learning also lead to the replicator dynamics equations similar to (1). For that,
they considered repeated plays of a 2x2 game between two agents who adjust their
probabilities for actions according to a reinforcement learning model of Cross
(1983), and derived the replicator dynamics equation in the limit of small pay-
offs. More general situations, both in terms of the type of the games, the kind of
reinforcement models and their relation to replicator-like equations are discussed
in a monograph by Fudenberg & Levine (1998), Rustichini (1999), Fudenberg &
Takahashi (2011), and Mertikopoulos & Sandholm (2016).
The law of effect can be expressed in many different ways, depending on
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which decision-making facilities are reinforced and on the specific rules of re-
inforcement. In the model of Cross (1983), it is the probability to play particular
action that undergoes reinforcement. In an alternative model motivated by bio-
chemical processes in neural circuits, Harley (1981) proposed the relative payoff
sum (RPS) algorithm as a decision making mechanism. The RPS learning rule
assumes the ability of organism to maintain a record of cumulative rewards from
previous experiences, which at epoch t is given by vector S(t) = (S1(t), ..,Sk(t)).
S(t) is the predictor for future behavior and can be interpreted as a vector of “moti-
vations” or “stimuli” to engage in a corresponding action. From the current stimuli
an agent computes the probability to play ti :
Si(t)
∑ j S j(t)
.
If action ti0 is chosen and it brings payoff Pi0(t), which is assumed to be non-
negative, then stimuli are updated according to the rule
Si0(t +1) = (1− µ¯)Si0(t)+ µ¯ri0 +Pi0(t), (2)
and for k 6= i0,
Sk(t +1) = (1− µ¯)Sk(t)+ µ¯rk. (3)
Positive parameter µ¯ expresses memory effect: payoff Pi(t− n) from n previous
plays will appear with the weight (1− µ¯)n+1 in the expression for Si(t + 1). Pa-
rameter ri is some default level (residual) of stimuli Si. For example, the residuals
might represent the genetic preference for the action. A similar learning model
was introduced by Roth & Erev (1995).
The goal of this paper is to address the question of behavior of RPS learn-
ing agents in large populations, where agents are randomly matched in pairwise
encounters, i.e. learning in heterogeneous populations. Unlike the evolutionary
dynamics framework, RPS learning agents can not be identified with some par-
ticular strategy they use all the time. The RPS rule will in general prescribe new
strategy every time an agent plays.
In these situations, the natural quantity to describe the state of agents is the
distribution of agents according to their current stimuli. In large populations, the
probability density function of this distribution can be approximated by a con-
tinuous function and its changes can be described by a non-linear Fokker-Planck
equation. The derivation of this equation, which generalizes the replicator dynam-
ics equation for heterogeneous populations, is contained in the Appendix of this
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paper. The assumptions needed for the derivation of the equation are: large pop-
ulation size, large number of plays of the game, and incremental (infinitesimal)
structure payoffs. This approach is a well-known method for modeling multi-
agent systems in the problems of physics, biology, economics and sociology, see
for example, Risken (1992) and Pareschi & Toscani (2014). A similar method has
been used by Traulsen, Claussen & Hauert (2005, 2006), in the analysis of the
evolutionary selection by Moran process.
After deriving the equations we apply them to determine the behavior of RPS
learners in symmetric 2x2 games. It should be kept in mind, however, that the time
asymptotic behavior based on the Fokker-Planck equation and the time asymp-
totic of the original discrete-time stochastic process are not, in general, the same.
Moreover, the PDE model derived in this paper is a leading approximation of a
continuous-time stochastic process. Thus, any statement claimed in this paper
about the convergence of the system to a particular state should be understood as
a statement that the system gets close to this state within the limits of the validity
of the PDE approximation.
In game theory, the method of stochastic approximation by Benam & Hirsch
(1999) is typically used to determine the long-time behavior interacting agents.
The method relies on the stability analysis of an averaged (deterministic) system
of ODEs. As the dimension of a system is of the order (the number of agents ) ×
(the number of strategies per agent), even for small populations it is an extremely
challenging task. The Fokker-Planck equation, on the other hand, is applicable
for large populations, the trade-off being the loss of information about a particular
player.
The analysis of the PDE model derived in this paper shows that for games with
a single Nash equilibrium, the strategies of all agents converge to the dominant
strategy, when the RPS rule has no memory factor, or with a memory factor and
zero residuals. For learning models with a memory factor the convergence is faster
than for the models with perfect memory. Additionally, the learning time in the
former case varies inversely with the size of the memory factor. For games with
a mixed Nash equilibrium, the learning process converges to a state in which the
population mean probability equals to the equilibrium value. As the population
mean probability approaches its limit, the “strength” of the learning decreases,
and the individual probabilities do not, in general, converge to the equilibrium
value. In this case, the population remains heterogeneous. Finally, if the memory
factor is present and residuals are not zeros, agent’s strategies converge to some
mixed strategy, for a generic 2x2 symmetric game.
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A B
A (ah, ah) (dh, ch)
B (ch, dh) (bh, bh)
Table 1: The incremental payoff matrix for the game. Parameters a,b,c,d,h are positive.
2. The Model
We consider a series of plays of a game between randomly selected individuals
in a large population. The payoff matrix of the game is given in the table 1. The
behaviors are labeled A and B. We will analyze the RPS learning in the games that
a) have a single pure Nash equilibrium with a > c, d > b (or a < c, d < b ); b) two
Nash equilibria with a > c, b > d; and c) mixed Nash equilibrium when a < c,
d > b. In the latter case, there are also two asymmetric Nash equilibria (A,B) and
(B,A).
Now, let there be a group of N individuals where each individual is character-
ized by vector X ti = (S
t
i,1,S
t
i,2) representing the accumulated stimuli to play A and
B, respectively, at epoch t. Suppose that two agents i and j are selected at random
to play the game. Agents play with the probabilities to cooperate St1,i/(S
t
1,i +S
t
2,i)
and St1, j/(S
t
1, j +S
t
2, j), for agent i and agent j, respectively. Denote the outcomes
(A,A), (A,B), (B,A), (A,A), where the first is the action chosen by agent i. As the
result of the interaction agent i increments his/her states according to the rule
X t+δi =


(r1µh+(1−µh)S
t
1,i +ah, r2µh+(1−µh))S
t
2,i), (A,A)
(r1µh+(1−µh)S
t
1,i + ch, r2µh+(1−µh))S
t
2,i), (A,B)
(r1µh+(1−µh))S
t
1,i, r2µh+(1−µh)S
t
2,i +dh), (B,A)
(r1µh+(1−µh))S
t
1,i, r2µh+(1−µh)S
t
2,i +bh), (B,B)
(4)
and symmetrically for agent j. (r1,r2) are the residual stimuli and µ ≥ 0 the pa-
rameter of the fading memory. The former is related to the memory factor µ¯ from
the introduction by formula µ¯ = µh. Then, time moves to the next epoch t + δ
and the process is reiterated. At time t = 0 agents have generally different, initial
levels of stimuli to cooperate and defect.
2.1. Stimuli-space
Our main interest is in the distribution of agents in the stimuli-space x =
(s1, s2), s1, s2 ≥ 0, described by the density function (PDF) f (x, t). In this space
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the straight lines through the origin represent the sets of stimuli of constant prob-
ability to cooperate when agent is playing a mixed strategy. The probability m
related to the slope k as m = (1+k)−1 so that the stimuli with preference for C are
located closer to the s1-axis. For any subset Ω in the stimuli space,
∫
Ω f (x, t)dx
represents the proportion of agents with their stimuli in the set Ω at time t.
The following equation is found to be a leading order approximation for the
process, when parameters h,δ are small and the number of players is large.
∂ f
∂ t
+div(u(x, t) f ) = 0, (5)
and velocity u
u(x, t) =
1
s1+ s2
[
(am¯(t)+d(1− m¯(t))s1+µ(r1− s1)(s1+ s2)
(cm¯(t)+b(1− m¯(t))s2+µ(r2− s2)(s1+ s2)
]
, (6)
where
m¯(t) =
∫
s1
s1+ s2
f (x, t)dx.
The analysis of the equation can be understood from the behavior of the system
of ODEs:
dx
dt
= u(x, t), (7)
and the equation for m¯(t) that follows from (5):
dm¯
dt
= ((a− c)m¯+(d−b)(1− m¯))
∫
s1s2
(s1+ s2)3
f (x, t)dx. (8)
The derivation of equations (5)–(8) is contained in the Appendix.
Velocity u represents the rates of change of the stimuli of agents whose current
state is given by x. The rates are proportional to the group average payoffs for
corresponding actions, and “penalized” by memory for large deviations from the
default residual levels (r1,r2). Equation (8) is convenient for analyzing the games
with pure Nash equilibrium. For the game with a mixed equilibrium, described by
the frequency m∗ to play A, more convenient is equation
d(m¯−m∗)
dt
= (c−a+d−b)(m¯−m∗)
∫
s1s2
(s1+ s2)3
f (x, t)dx. (9)
The nonlinear equation (5) is the first order approximation of the stochastic,
learning process. The next order approximation contains a diffusion term, with
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the diffusion coefficients of order h. The diffusion generally prevents the con-
vergence of learning of the group to a single strategy (fixation). For example,
the convergence of the group learning to a single strategy, based on equation (5),
only indicates that the distribution of agents’ strategies gets close to that particular
strategy, within the limits of validity of equation (5).
Now we consider the dynamics of learning in symmetric 2× 2 games. First
we consider models with no memory factor, µ = 0.
2.2. Pure Nash equilibrium
Let a > c and d > b. The characteristic property of this regime is the positive
sign of m¯′(t) in equation (8), for any distribution function f . This reflects the fact
that action C is your best choice, no matter what your opponent does.
It is shown in Appendix that m¯(t) increases to its maximum value 1 and the
support of function f is transported to infinity along the trajectories of ODE (7). In
particular the stimuli of all agents, for large values of t will be located below any
straight line of positive slope through the origin. That is, asymptotically all agents
learn to play the equilibrium strategy “always A”. The inclusion the second-order
effects does not change the asymptotic picture.
2.3. Mixed Nash equilibrium
Let a < c and d > b. The equilibrium mixed strategy is m∗ =
d−b
c−a+d−b and the
group average probability to play A evolves according to equation (9).
It is shown in Appendix that the dynamics of equation (5) implies that m¯(t)
converges to the equilibrium density m∗. The population average probability to
play A asymptotically coincides with the probability m∗ at the Nash equilibrium.
Unlike the pure Nash equilibrium case, in general, agents keep playing with dif-
ferent strategies. This can be seen from the following example. If the initial data
f0(x) describes the population of agents playing different strategies and is such
that ∫
s1
s1+ s2
f0(x)dx = m∗,
then the trajectories of the flow generated by u are straight lines and for any t > 0,∫
s1
s1+ s2
f (x, t)dx = m∗.
Clearly, for all t, there is non-diminishing spread in the distribution function
f (x, t). To put it differently, there is no learning when the group average prob-
ability to play A equals m∗, because players expected payoffs from A and B are
equal.
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2.4. Two Nash equilibria
For this type of game a > c and d < b. Denote by m∗ =
b−d
a−c+b−d . As in the
previous case, the group average probability to play A evolves according to equa-
tion (9). If the initial data m¯(0) > m∗ velocity carries f to values of stimulus
values of s1 much larger than s2. As the average m¯(t) increases, the dynamics
is consistent and leads to learning of the Nash equilibrium A. With m¯(0) < m∗
learning converges to the other equilibrium. In the borderline case m¯(0) = m∗, is
unstable: stimuli increase along the straight lines, and agents retain their initial
probabilities to play A and B, but any perturbations will deviate the system to A
or B equilibrium.
2.5. Memory factor RPS
Consider now models with µ > 0. It can be seen from equation (6) that a
sufficiently large box [0, sˆ1]× [0, sˆ2] is invariant under the flow of (7). This can be
seen from the sign of the velocity components. We show in Appendix that with
residuals r1,r2 > 0, RPS learning will approach an asymptotically stable point in
the stimuli space, for any positive payoff rates a,b,c,d. All agents will tend to
play a mixed strategy m∗ =
s∗1
s∗1+s
∗
2
. When (A,A) is a Nash equilibrium, the ratio of
stimuli s∗1/s
∗
2 > r1/r2, and agents favor action A after learning more than at their
default levels.
There is an interesting limiting case of zero residuals r1 = r2 = 0. For such
RPS models, when the game has (A,A) as the single Nash equilibrium, all agents
learn this optimal strategy, as function f (x, t) converges to a delta mass supported
at the point (a/µ,0).
In this case, the equation for mean m¯(t) is closely approximated by the repli-
cator dynamics equation (11) given below. The factor (s1(t)+ s2(t))
−1 on the
right-hand side of that equation, in this case, is of order 1. The convergence to the
optimal strategy is faster than in the case of learning with perfect memory (µ = 0),
for which the factor is of the order (1+ t)−1.
Moreover, among the models with a memory factor, the learning period ap-
pears to be shorter for larger values of µ, see figure 1 and explanations in Ap-
pendix.
Thus it appears that RPS models with small residuals and large values of µ
should be preferred by natural selection. In such models agents act predominantly
on the basis of the last few payoffs. In this context it is worth mentioning that
one of the postulates of prospect theory of Kahneman & Trverski (1984), is the
statement that people actions (in games with monetary payoffs) are directed by
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the increase in their total wealth, rather than the total accumulated wealth, which
shows a tendency to use short memory and suggests that RPS learning might be
at work.
2.6. Relation to the Replicator Dynamics Equation (RDE)
If one postulates that all agents have the same, or approximately the same,
stimuli
X ti = (s1(t),s2(t)), ∀ i = 1..N, (10)
for some s1(t),s2(t), so that f (s, t) is represented by a delta function supported
at (s1(t),s2(t)), then equation (5), leads to a variant of the replicator dynamics
equation for the probability to cooperate m(t) = s1(t)/(s1(t)+ s2(t)) :
dm
dt
=
1
s1(t)+ s2(t)
m(1−m)((a− c)m+(d−b)(1−m)) . (11)
Notice the positive factor on the right-hand side of the equation. For a learning
processes in which stimuli increase the learning rate slows down. The extent to
which hypothesis (10) is consistent with the dynamics of (7) is limited only to the
cases when the latter has a single asymptotically stable fixed point.
3. Appendix: a PDE model
3.1. Fokker-Planck equation
Consider a group of N individuals acting according to RPS learning rule de-
scribed in section 2. Let X t = (X t1, ..,X
t
N) represent the vector of pairs of stim-
uli for all members at epoch t. Each component of this vector is 2-dimensional:
X ti = (S
t
1,i,S
t
2,i). By wh(x¯, t), where x ∈ [0,1]
2N, we denote PDF for distribution
of X t. We will write x¯ = (x1, ..xN), where each xi = (s1,i,s2,i). The probability to
play A will be denoted as λi = s1,i/(s1,i + s2,i).
Suppose that member i and j are selected for the interaction. There will be
only one game played during the period from t to t +δ . The matrix of payoffs is
described in table 1. The range of parameters δ , h, N will be restricted later on.
Conditioned on the event X t = x¯, the agent probabilities for the next period are
set according to the RPS rule (4), which in the notation of the stochastic process
are
X t+δi =


((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh+ah, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh) Prob= λiλj
((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh+dh, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh) Prob= λi(1−λj)
((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh+ ch) Prob= (1−λi)λj
((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh+bh) Prob= (1−λi)(1−λj)
9
and symmetrically for X t+δj . For all other agents, X
t+δ
k = X
t
k for k 6= i, j. The
definition of X t makes it a discrete-time Markov process. We proceed by writing
down the integral form of the Chapman-Kolmogorov equations and approximate
its solution by a solution of the Fokker-Planck equation (forward Kolmogorov’s
equation), for small values of δ ,h and large N.
Change of wh(x¯, t) from t to t +δ , can be described in the following way.∫
φ(x¯)wh(x¯, t +δ )dx¯ = E[φ(X
t+h)]
= ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫ (
λiλ jφ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh+ah,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh+ah,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh)
+λi(1−λ j)φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh+dh,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh+ch)
+(1−λi)λ jφ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh+ch)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh+dh,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh)
+(1−λi)(1−λ j)φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh+bh)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh+bh)
)
wh(x¯, t)dx¯. (12)
This equation can be written in slightly different way:
∫
φ(x¯)wh(x¯, t +δ )dx¯ =
∫
φ(x¯)wh(x, t)dx¯
+ ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫ (
λiλ j[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh+ah,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh+ah,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh)
−φ(x¯)]
+λi(1−λ j)[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh+dh,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh+ch)
−φ(x¯)]
+(1−λi)λ j[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh+ch)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh+dh,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh)
−φ(x¯)]
+(1−λi)(1−λ j)[φ(x¯)
∣∣∣ xi=((1−µh)s1,i+r1µh,(1−µh)s2,i+r2µh+bh)
x j=((1−µh)s1, j+r1µh,(1−µh)s2, j+r2µh+bh)
−φ(x¯)]
)
wh(x¯, t)dx¯.
(13)
The above equation can be used to obtain 2N-dimensional ODE approxi-
mation of the stochastic process by evaluating limh→0
(
E[X t+h |X t]−X t
)
/h =
10
F(X t). This approach was implemented in the method of stochastic approxima-
tion developed by Benaim-Hirsch (1999) and applied to the study of convergence
of stochastic fictitious play processes. The method guarantees the convergence of
the process X t under certain stability conditions for the dynamics of the associated
ODE.
The large dimension of that dynamical system is an obstacle for further anal-
ysis. In contrast, we would like to obtain an equation for the distribution of large
number N of agents in 2-dimensional stimuli space. For this, denote the PDF of
the distribution by
fh(x, t) = ∑
k
N−1
∫
wh(x¯)
∣∣
xk=x
dx¯k, x ∈ R
2,
where x¯k is a 2N−2 dimensional vector of all coordinates, excluding xk. In statis-
tical physics this function is also called one-particle distribution. In the formulas
to follow we need to use two-particle distribution function
gh(x,y, t) = ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
wh(x¯)
∣∣
xi=x,x j=y
dx¯i j,
where x¯i j is the 2N−4 dimensional vector of all coordinated excluding xi and x j.
Function gh is symmetric in (x,y) and is related to fh by the formulas
fh(x, t) =
∫
gh(x,y, t)dx =
∫
gh(x,y, t)dy.
The moments of function fh and gh are computed from the moment of wh :∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t)dx = ∑
k
N−1
∫
ψ(xk)wh(x¯)dx¯,
and ∫
ω(x,y)gh(x,y, t)dxdy = ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫
ω(xi,x j)wh(x¯)dx¯.
This follows from the definition of these functions.
Now we use (13) to obtain an integral equation of the change of function fh.
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For that select φ(x¯) = ψ(xk), sum over k and take average. We get∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t +δ )dx =
∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t)dx
+N−1 ∑
i 6= j
(N(N−1))−1
∫ (
λiλ j[ψ((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh+ah, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j + r1µh+ah, (1−µh)s2, j + r2µh)−ψ(x j)]
+λi(1−λ j)[ψ((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh+dh, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j + r1µh, (1−µh)s2, j + r2µh+ ch)−ψ(x j)]
+(1−λi)λ j[ψ((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh+ ch)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j + r1µh+dh, (1−µh)s2, j + r2µh)−ψ(x j)]
+(1−λi)(1−λ j)[ψ((1−µh)s1,i + r1µh, (1−µh)s2,i + r2µh+bh)−ψ(xi)
+ψ((1−µh)s1, j + r1µh, (1−µh)s2, j + r2µh+bh)−ψ(x j)]
)
wh(x¯, t)dx¯. (14)
The right-hand side can be conveniently expressed in terms of the two-particle
function gh :
∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t +δ )dx =
∫
ψ(x) fh(x, t)dx
+2N−1
∫
(λ (x)λ (y)[ψ((1−µh)sx1+ r1µh+ah, (1−µh)s
x
2+ r2µh)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)s
y
1+ r1µh+ah, (1−µh)s
y
2+ r2µh)−ψ(y)]
+λ (x)(1−λ (y))[ψ((1−µh)sx1+ r1µh+dh, (1−µh)s
x
2+ r2µh)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)s
y
1+ r1µh, (1−µh)s
y
2+ r2µh+ ch)−ψ(y)]
+(1−λ (x))λ (y)[ψ((1−µh)sx1+ r1µh, (1−µh)s
x
2+ r2µh+ ch)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)sy1+ r1µh+dh, (1−µh)s
y
2+ r2µh)−ψ(y)]
+(1−λ (x))(1−λ (y))[ψ((1−µh)sx1+ r1µh, (1−µh)s
x
2+ r2µh+bh)−ψ(x)
+ψ((1−µh)s
y
1+ r1µh, (1−µh)s
y
2+ r2µh+bh)−ψ(y)]
)
gh(x,y, t)dxdy. (15)
12
where x = (sx1,s
x
2), y = (s
y
1,s
y
2), and λ (x) = s
x
1/(s
x
1+ s
x
2), and similar for λ (y). In
the processes with large number of agents and random binary interactions, two-
particle distribution function can be factored into two independent distributions:
gh(x,y, t) = fh(x, t) fh(y, t).
With this relation, (15), becomes a family of non-linear integral relations for the
next time step distribution fh(x, t+δ ). Taking the Taylor expansions up to the first
order for the increment of the test function ψ, we obtain integral equations:
N
2h
∫
ψ(x)( fh(x, t +δ )− fh(x, t))dx =
2m¯h(t)
∫
(λ (x)(a+µ(r1− s1))∂s1ψ(x)+λ (x)µ(r2− s2)∂s2ψ(x)) fh(x, t)dx
+2(1−m¯h(t))
∫
(λ (x)(d+µ(r1− s1))∂s1ψ(x)+λ (x)µ(r2− s2)∂s2ψ(x)) fh(x, t)dx
+2m¯h(t)
∫
((1−λ (x))(µ(r1− s1))∂s1ψ(x)
+(1−λ (x))(c+µ(r2− s2))∂s2ψ(x)) fh(x, t)dx
+2(1− m¯h(t))
∫
((1−λ (x))(µ(r1− s1))∂s1ψ(x)
+(1−λ (x))(b+µ(r2− s2))∂s2ψ(x)) fh(x, t)dx
where m¯h(t) =
∫
λ (x) fh(x, t)dx.
Combining various terms on the right-hand side of the equation we get
N
4h
∫
ψ(x)( fh(x, t +δ )− fh(x, t))dx =
∫
(v1∂s1ψ + v2∂s2ψ) fh(x, t)dx,
with
v1 = λ (x)(am¯h(t)+(1− m¯h(t))d)+µ(r1− s1),
v2 = (1−λ (x))(cm¯h(t)+(1− m¯h(t))b)+µ(r2− s2).
By integrating the right-hand side by parts, and assuming that h,δ are small
and N is large, in such a way that 4h
δN
= 1, we obtain the Fokker-Planck equation:
∂ f
∂ t
+div(u(x, t) f ) = 0, (16)
where x = (s1,s2), s1,s2 > 0 and the drift velocity is given by the formula
u(x, t) =
1
s1+ s2
[
(am¯(t)+d(1− m¯(t))s1+µ(r1− s1)(s1+ s2)
(cm¯(t)+b(1− m¯(t))s2+µ(r2− s2)(s1+ s2)
]
,
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where
m¯(t) =
∫
s1
s1+ s2
f (x, t)dx. (17)
Equation (8) is obtained from (16) by multiplying it by λ (x) = s1(s1+s2), and
integrating by parts. We’re assuming here that the support of f is contained in the
interior of the first quadrant, so that f is zero on the boundary. That is to say that
all agents play mixed strategies. This is a natural hypothesis, as nothing else can
be learned if an agent chooses an action with certainty.
Consider now the learning from playing a symmetric n× n game. Let the
payoff to playing ith action against jth be equal to ai jh.Denote the stimulus vector
x = (s1, ..,sn), and the population average probability to play i by
m¯i(t) =
∫
si
∑ j s j
f (x, t)dx, i = 1..n.
The first-order approximation of the RPS learning process is given by the Fokker-
Planck equation
∂ f
∂ t
+div(u(x, t) f ) = 0,
on the domain with si ≥ 0, i = 1..n. In this equation, the velocity vector u =
(u1, ..,un) is given by its components
ui(x, t) =
1
∑ j s j
[(
∑
j
ai jm¯ j(t)
)
si +µ(ri− si)∑
j
s j
]
, i = 1..n.
Now we consider in some detail the learning in 2x2 games. Much of the anal-
ysis of equation (16) is derived from the behavior of trajectories of ODE (7). The
solution f of (16) is obtained by transporting the support of f0 along trajectories
of the dynamical system (7) and changing the values f0 so that the “mass” (mea-
sured by the density function f ) of any “fluid element” remains constant. In fact
on can write down the formula for f in terms of u and prove that the solution f
of the non-linear problem exists and unique. This can be done by standard meth-
ods of PDEs, but it is outside of the scope of the present paper. Here, we will be
interested in the long time, qualitative asymptotic for f (x, t).
Equation (16) is considered in the first quadrant s1,s2 > 0. For µ = 0, the
boundary of the domain in invariant under the flow of (7). For the model with
fading memory, µ > 0, the velocity u at the boundary is directed into the flow
domain. In either case, we will assume that the function f0(x) is zero on the
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boundary. Then, this property will hold for all t > 0. Additionally, in all of the
analysis below, we assume that f0 is a continuously differentiable function with
compact support (zero outside some bounded set).
Consider the case of the pure Nash equilibrium (a > c,d > b) and no memory
effects, µ = 0. The velocity
u(x, t) =
1
s1+ s2
M(t)x,
where matrix
M(t) =
[
am¯(t)+d(1− m¯(t)) 0
0 cm¯(t)+b(1− m¯(t))
]
For any t, the origin is an unstable node with two positive eigenvalues; the eigen-
value corresponding to s1–direction is the dominant one. From the phase portrait
of the ODE it is clear that the flow transports the support of f into the region where
s1 ≫ s2, which correspond to the case of all agents asymptotically in t adopting
choice C in the game.
In the case of the mixed Nash equilibrium (a < c,d > b) and no memory
effect, µ = 0, the origin is an unstable node. When m¯(t) = m∗ then two positive
eigenvalues coincide, and all trajectories are straight lines through the origin. In
general, however, m¯(t) 6= m∗, if for example they are not equal at time t = 0. In
such cases equation (9) can be used to show that limt→∞ m¯(t) = m∗. Let m¯(0) >
m∗. Then, according to (9), m¯(0)> m¯(t)> m∗ for all t, and m¯(t) converges to m∗
provided that ∫ ∞
0
∫
s1s2
(s1+ s2)3
f (x, t)dxdt (18)
diverges. Notice also, that the derivative of ratio s2/s1 along a flow trajectory
equals
d
dt
(
s2
s1
)
= (c−a+d−b)(m¯(t)−m∗)
s1s2
s1+ s2
> 0.
Thus, if at t = 0 the support of f0(·) is strictly inside the first quadrant, then there
c > 0 such that s2/s1 > c for all points in the support of f (·, t) for all later times.
In particular, one can estimate
∫
s1s2
(s1+ s2)3
f (x, t)dx =
∫
s2/s1
(1+ s2/s1)(s1+ s2)
s1
s1+ s2
f (x, t)dx
> sup
(s1,s2)∈supp f (·,t)
c
(1+ c)(s1+ s2)
m¯(t). (19)
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Finally,since u(x, t) is uniformly bounded, i.e., for any (x, t), |u(x, t)| < C, for
some C, then for any x in the support of f (·, t) there a constant Cˆ such that |x| <
Cˆ(1+ t). From this and (19) it follows that∫
s1s2
(s1+ s2)3
f (x, t)dx >Cm∗(1+ t)
−1,
for some constantC> 0, and so, the integral in (18) is infinite. The case m¯(0)<m∗
follows by similar arguments.
Consider now the model with the memory decay when µ > 0 and residuals
r1,r2 > 0. For any value of m¯(t) ∈ [0,1] and any set of positive parameters of the
game a,b,c,d > 0 the right-hand side of (7) has a steady state (s01(t),s
0
2(t)) in the
interior of the first quadrant, with s01 > r1, s
0
2 > r2, and this point is an asymptoti-
cally stable node. The other steady state is the origin, which is an unstable node.
The support of f (x, t) moves in the direction of the stable interior point, contract-
ing in size. When it becomes sufficiently small, the dynamics can be effectively
approximated by ODE:
d(s1,s2)
dt
= (u¯1, u¯2) where the new velocity
u¯1 =
a(s1)
2
(s1+ s2)2
+
ds1s2
(s1+ s2)2
+µ(r1− s1),
u¯2 =
cs1s2
(s1+ s2)2
+
b(s2)
2
(s1+ s2)2
+µ(r2− s2).
In a long run the fixed point will settle at the stable, interior state x∗ = (s∗1,s
∗
2), and
f (x, t) will be a delta-function supported at that point. In this process the agents
learn to play A with probability m∗ = s
∗
1/(s
∗
1+ s
∗
2).
A special case of zero residuals r1 = r2 = 0 deserves a discussion. In the
limit of zero residuals r1,r2 → 0, velocity u (for any fixed t > 0) has three fixed
points: x0(t)= ((am¯(t)+d(1−m¯(t))/µ,0), x1 = (0,(cm¯(t)+b(1−m¯(t))/µ) and
(0,0).When a > c,d > b, the first, corresponding to the strategy “always A”, is an
asymptotically stable node, the second, corresponding to “always B”, is a saddle,
and the origin is an unstable node. One can compute that on any trajectory of the
velocity field u(x, t) inside the first quadrant,
d
dt
(
s1
s2
)
> 0.
Thus, the population average probability to play A, m¯(t), increases to 1, the sta-
ble stationary point x0(t) converges to x0 = (a/mu,0), and the support of f (x, t)
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Figure 1: Learning time to equilibrium in the game with a=3, b=1, c=d=2, h=0.01, N=100 and µ
ranging from 0.5 to 10 with increment of 0.5. All agents have stimuli (1,1) at the beginning of
the process. Learning time is a time it takes for at least 90% of population to have probabilities
to play A in the range [0.9,1]. Each learning time is the average over 20 simulations. Units of
time are arbitrary. The line plot is the best fit to the data points by function c0µ
−1. The figure was
generated using MatLab R2017b software.
moves toward point x0. The agents with memory decay and zero residual levels do
learn the optimal strategy. Moreover, because the learning occurs in the bounded
region of the stimuli space, the convergence to the equilibrium is faster than the
case of learning with perfect memory µ = 0. Using equation (11) we can also
estimate on the rate of convergence as a function of µ. The rate is proportional to
µ implying that the characteristic time of convergence to beC/µ. Figure 1 shows
the simulations of the stochastic process in this regime for different values of µ.
It shows that the prediction based on the model (16) is in good agreement with
the stochastic learning process. We conclude that models with low residuals and
high µ perform better in learning the optimal strategy in 2x2 games and thus more
likely to evolve.
3.2. Second order effects
The inclusion of the next order approximation into consideration adds a dif-
fusion term into equation (16) with the diffusion coefficients proportional to h. In
the problems where the drift velocity takes f to regions with large values of x, as
in the case of the pure or mixed Nash equilibrium, diffusion will have a marginal
effect. In the problems with asymptotically stable fixed points in stimuli space
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(short memory models) diffusion will create a stationary distribution of f near the
fixed point, preventing all agents to adopt a single strategy.
The author wishes to thank the anonymous referees for patient reading of the
manuscript and detailed comments that helped to improve it in so many ways.
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